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T he long delay in the passing of theWomen’s Reservation Bill has
contributed to a growing tendency to ask
whether the existing Bill built around a 33
per cent reservation for women is the best
way forward. There has been a demand to
consider dual-member constituencies as a
way forward by academics like Medha
Nanivadekar and Meena Dhanda. The
National Alliance of People’s Movements
too has called for a campaign on a number
of issues including “Instead of demanding
33% reservation for women in parliamentary
institutions, let there be representation of
both sexes from each constituency at every
level of governance.”1
This report seeks to evaluate the option
of dual-member constituencies as a way
forward for women’s reservation, in
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
comparison to the existing option based on
one-third reservation of seats for women. In
order to do so it first arrives at a set of three
criteria: the extent of reservation; the extent
to which the proposed model minimizes
exclusion; and the impact it will have on
the quality of representation in the polity as
a whole.
In the current Bill one-third of the seats
in the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies
are to be reserved for women. The reserved
seats will be chosen through a process of
rotation by draw of lots in such a way that
a seat shall be reserved only once in three
consecutive elections. And the reservations
for women will cease after 15 years.
In terms of the extent of reservation
the Bill allows for 181 out of the current
strength of 544 seats to be reserved for
1 Mass mailer from National Alliance of Peoples’ Movements calling for support for the Lokshakti Abhiyan’s
campaign at various centres across India. Mail received from napmindia@napm-india.org. (accessed on
16 December 2011)
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women. It does so by excluding men from
one third of the constituencies. It tries to
reduce the effect of this exclusion through a
rotation of seats. But this rotation implies
that the men elected to seats that are to be
reserved in the next round have no possibility
of re-election. To the extent that women who
have won in reserved seats would find it
difficult to win when the seats are made
general, they too have very limited scope
for re-election. In other words members
elected to two-thirds of the seats in the Lok
Sabha and State Assemblies will have little
or no scope for re-election. These members
would have very little incentive to nurture
their constituencies. This would in turn affect
the levels of accountability and the quality
of representation.
The alternative that this report
explores advocates converting all the
existing constituencies into dual member
ones, with one male and one female
representative. This simple mechanism
raises the extent of reservation for women
to 50 per cent, from the 33 per cent in the
existing Bill. It does so without excluding
men from any constituency in the country.
There are also several aspects of this
transformation that can contribute to
improving the quality of representation. It
allows the electorate to compare the
performance of two representatives. It
halves the number of citizens to MP ratio,
which in India is currently among the
highest in the world. As it does not
involve rotation it allows individual
parliamentarians to build a career around
their service to their constituencies. It does
not require the reservation to be stopped at
any point as it guarantees representation
in proportion to the gender distribution of
the population.
The creation of dual member
constituencies of the kind elaborated above
will require amendments to the Constitution
of India and other statutes. A draft Bill that
would bring about these changes has been
presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
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M ore than a decade and a half afterthe  Women’s Reservation Bill
was first introduced in the Lok Sabha, in
1996, it is yet to become law. Despite the
Bill being passed in the Rajya Sabha in 2010
and the formal approval of most political
parties, there is still a fair degree of
uncertainty about when it would be
considered by the Lok Sabha. Much of this
delay could be attributed to the deep-rooted
gender bias within the Parliament. This bias
is reflected in the fact that the proportion of
women in the Indian Parliament has been
consistently less than 10 per cent.2 The
passing of the Women’s Reservation Bill
would then require a significant proportion
of the male members of the Parliament
voting against the interests of their gender.
It is tempting to then see the delay in the
passing of the Women’s Reservation Bill as
no more than an unavoidable part of the
battle with vested interests in the Parliament.
But this reality brings with it another
question: Is there anything in the current
form of the Bill that is making it more
difficult to pass?
To ask such a question when a
particular version of the Women’s
Reservation Bill is under consideration can
open us to the charge of being disruptive. It
could be said that the entire effort must be
to pass the current version of the Bill, even
if it has flaws. But with Bills that have been
tabled in Parliament in the past having
lapsed, we cannot rule out a similar fate for
the current Bill. The way forward would then
not be in simply expecting what has failed
in the past to succeed now. What is needed
is fresh thinking that would result from a




2 Rajya Sabha Secretariat (2008) “Reservation of Seats for Women in Legislative Bodies: Perspectives”,
Occasional Paper Series 1/2008.
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issue of reservation for women. And such a
revival will be easier if we acknowledge that
there has not been complete unanimity on
what an ideal Women’s Reservation Bill
should look like, even among the strongest
advocates of women’s reservation. More
recently there has been a case made for
dual-member constituencies as the way
forward in women’s reservation by Medha
Nanivadekar and Meena Dhanda. Lokshakti
Abhiyan, which is a part of the National
Alliance of Peoples Movements too has
called for a campaign on a number of issues
including “Instead of demanding 33%
reservation let there be representation of
both sexes from each constituency at every
level of governance.”3 Is it time then to ask
whether some of the other suggestions stand
a better chance of success?
There is of course a danger that is built
into this question as well. It is quite possible,
even likely, that the easiest law to pass would
be the one that offers only cosmetic change,
if that. The ease with which a Bill becomes
law cannot then be the sole criterion for
deciding the value of a particular approach
to women’s reservation. We would need to
also focus on what the Bill would actually
achieve and how it should go about doing
so. And it is here that the debate reflects
considerable diversity. There are differences
over the ideal points of intervention, with
some preferring to intervene within political
parties at the time when candidates are
chosen,4 while others prefer to step in at the
point of the actual elections by reserving
constituencies for women. Among those who
focus on reserving constituencies too there
is considerable difference between those who
demand that a third of the existing
constituencies be reserved for women5 and
those who would like to find place for women
in the Parliament through the device of
multi-member constituencies.6 Each of these
approaches will have different consequences
for the composition of the Parliament. These
consequences would have to be evaluated
before we can decide whether the form of
reservation in the Bill passed by the Rajya
Sabha in 2010 is the best, and only, way
forward.
In evaluating these consequences we
will be influenced, implicitly if not explicitly,
by our approach to the question of justice,
in this case gender justice. If we formulate
the issue in abstract without considering the
3 Mass mailer from National Alliance of Peoples Movements calling for support for the Lokshakti Abhiyan’s
campaign at various centres across India. Mail received from napmindia@napm-india.org. Accessed on
16th December 2011.
4 Narayan, J., D. Sheth, Y. Yadav and M. Kishwar (2000) ‘Enhancing Women’s Representation in the
Legislatures: An Alternative to the Government Bill for Women’s Reservation’, Manushi 116: 5-9.
5 The Constitution (One Hundred and Eighth Amendement) Bill (2008) also called the Women’s Reservation
Bill (2008).
6 Nanivadekar, M. (2003) ‘Dual-Member Constituencies: Resolving Deadlock on Women’s Reservation’,
Economic and Political Weekly 38 (43): 4506-10.
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conditions that exist on the ground we could
come up with a system that we believe will
be perfect and then worry about the process
of implementing it later. Such a system
would begin with the ideal and then
compromise in the effort to get it
implemented. Alternatively we could be
much more sensitive to conditions on the
ground. We would then be much more likely
to come with a system of reservation that
recognizes the various interconnections
between reservation for women and the
larger issue of reservations. The systems of
reservation for women that arises from these
two approaches are unlikely to be the same.
In putting the debate on women’s
reservation through this filter, it is useful,
following Amartya Sen, to make a
distinction between two broad approaches
to intervention in favour of justice, including
gender justice. The first approach, which Sen
calls ‘transcendental institutionalism’, has
two dimensions. “First, it concentrates its
attention on what it identifies as perfect
justice, rather than relative comparisons
of justice and injustice. . . Second, in
searching for perfection, transcendental
institutionalism concentrates primarily on
getting the institutions right, and it is not
focused on the actual societies that would
ultimately emerge.”7 The emphasis here is
on the ideal, both in the prescriptions for
reservations as well as in the institutions that
are to be used to ensure effective reservations
for women in Parliament.
In contrast with transcendental
institutionalism, there is the alternative
approach which Sen calls, ‘realization
focused comparison’. This was the approach
of a number of other Enlightenment thinkers
who “took a variety of comparative
approaches that were concerned with social
realizations (resulting from actual
institutions, actual behaviour and other
influences). . . Even though these authors,
with their very different ideas of the demands
of justice, proposed quite distinct ways of
making social comparisons, it can be said,
at the risk of only a slight exaggeration, that
they were all involved in comparisons of
societies that already existed or could
feasibly emerge, rather than confining their
analyses to transcendental searches for a
perfectly just society.”8 In this approach what
matters is that the proposed change leads to
a situation that is better than what exists,
without being preoccupied with defining the
ideal.
The debate on women’s reservation
reflects this dichotomy. At one end we have
the approach of those who have worked out
an ideal in abstract. For many of them
actions that do not lead to the creation of
that abstract ideal are often not worth
pursuing. For instance, Menon claims that
“the link between reservations in parliament
APPROACHES TO WOMEN'S RESERVATION
7 Sen, A. (2010) The Idea of Justice, New Delhi: Penguin Books, pp. 5-6.
8 Sen, A. (2010) The Idea of Justice, New Delhi: Penguin Books, pp. 7.
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and “empowerment” of women is at best
tenuous, may even be a way of closing off
possibilities of further radicalization of
Indian politics… If we attempt to recover
feminist politics as subversion, ….we would
need to move away from politics as merely
seeking space within already defined
boundaries of power”.9 Similarly Rai argues
that “political representation would be a
strategy of recognition rather than
redistribution, thus limiting its
transformative potential.”10 Even among
those who are less dismissive of reservations,
the precise details of what can be considered
ideal has tended to vary quite considerably.
But whatever the preferred ideal, they have
typically been worked out in abstract with
only minimal, if that, explicit analysis of
the local reality within which they will have
to work. The main focus has been on the
abstract ideal and the effort to push this ideal
through the most important institutions of a
democracy, including and especially,
parliament. This approach would be a good
example of transcendental institutionalism.
At the other end, we have the approach
of those who believe that in search of a
perfect solution we are losing the forest for
the trees. In Nanivadekar’s words:
“But we need not insist on a perfect
solution as long as the one available
is sufficiently satisfactory. We have
been coping with so many imperfect
systems and processes for all these
years, be it our method of election
based on the principle of ‘first past
the post’ that elects or defeats the
candidate with the margin of just one
vote over her/his nearest rival, our
undemocratic party structures,
criminalization of politics,
fragmented polity leading to unstable
governments - all these issues easily
qualify as red hot targets for
perfectionism. If we really want
perfection, let us not begin and end
our perfectionism with the issue of
women’s reservation alone.”11
This approach of accepting the social
realities and formulating solutions by
learning from the existing experiences could
also be associated with the effort to reserve
seats for women in local bodies. These
reservations have been introduced in the
Panchayati Raj institutions of different
states. In these cases the reservation of seats
for women has been closely linked to other
reservations, including those based on caste.12
9 Menon, N. (1997) ‘Reservations and Representation’, Seminar, Special Issue on ‘Empowering Women’,
457:41.
10 Rai, S. M. (1999) ‘Democratic institutions, political representation and women’s empowerment: The
quota debate in India’, Democratization 6 (3):87.
11 Nanivadekar, M. (2003) ‘Dual-Member Constituencies: Resolving Deadlock on Women’s Reservation’,
Economic and Political Weekly 38 (43):4507.
12 Karnataka is a good example of such reservations, with seats being reserved in Panchayati Raj Institutions
not just for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, but also for Backward Castes and women.
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This approach is much more sensitive to
conditions on the ground, and to the
possibility of ensuring that the reservations
are implemented. Indeed, the reservation for
women in Panchayati Raj bodies has been
implemented in states where the local social
dynamics are known to be dominated by a
very strong gender bias against women. The
focus here is on the working of the system,
whether the resultant situation is better or
worse than the earlier one. Thus, though it
is widely known that husbands often take
decisions on behalf of the wives holding an
elected position in a panchayat, there is the
possibility that the exposure of the women
to political power will contribute to an
improvement in their status over time. This
approach would appear to be an example
of ‘realization focused comparison’.
In citing the example of reservations
for women in panchayat institutions we must
not give the impression that what works at
the local level will necessarily work at the
national level. Those who have closely
followed the operation of reservation for
women in rural local bodies have noticed
that there is a distinction in the operation of
reservation at the different levels of local
bodies. The village panchayats, being
concerned with local issues alone, tend to
find a prominent place for caste in their
decision making. As we move to the district
level bigger players enter the field and class
becomes a more important factor.13 It would
be natural then to expect that the stakes
to be much higher at the national level.
The models of reservation that can be
implemented at the local level cannot
then be simply replicated at the national
level.
When we ask the question whether
some of the models of reservation for women
would have a better chance of success (both
in terms of implementation as well as the
impact on the role of women) than the one
adopted in the Bill, we are in effect moving
to a ‘realization focused comparison’. We
would like to compare what is, or can be,
realized from each of the Bills. Implicit in
such a comparison is what we consider to
be a success. Any meaningful criteria of
success would include both the possible
effects of the proposals as well as likelihood
of it moving towards the goal of gender
equality and justice.
Subjecting the various prescriptions
that have been made in the course of the
debate on the Women’s Reservation Bill to
this test would be a time-consuming task. If
we take into account the details of each
suggestion, there are a very large number
of options available. But to the extent that
many of these suggestions share some broad
characteristics such a detailed analysis
would be repetitive. We would then be better
off classifying the suggestions into broad
APPROACHES TO WOMEN'S RESERVATION
13 We are grateful to Nirmala Buch for pointing this out at the National Workshop on ‘Can dual-member
constituencies be the way forward for women’s reservation?’ National Institute of Advanced Studies,
Bangalore, December 14, 2011.
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categories and then evaluating a
representative version of each of them.
At the risk of oversimplification we
could argue that there are three broad
options available. First, we could change the
way political parties function so that they
offer a greater number of seats for women.
Second, we could reserve a certain
proportion of the seats for women, as in the
current Bill with rotation of the reserved
constituencies being taken as the
representative version. And third, we could
consider the option of multimember
constituencies, with dual membership with
one from each gender being taken as the
representative version.
In the interests of a more focused
debate we may be better off reducing the
options to two, by placing on the backburner
the option of intervention in the functioning
of political parties. For this option to be
considered realistically, we would need to
have political parties with credible
mechanisms of internal democracy. In a
situation where most parties get even their
existing democratic institutions to simply
pass resolutions leaving decisions to the
‘High Command’, the scope for meaningful
intervention is very limited. Even the best
intentioned initiatives could end up being
distorted to suit the gender bias of the party.
For instance, the suggestion that political
parties must be required to give a certain
proportion of their tickets to women could
be easily distorted by offering seats to
women where the party has no chance of
victory. This report therefore focuses on
comparing the existing Women’s
Reservation Bill with an alternative that is
based on dual-member constituencies.
In what follows, we begin by reviewing
the literature on reservations to arrive at a
set of criteria for success. We then go on to
evaluate the current Bill in terms of those
criteria. This is followed by the same
exercise being carried out for reservations
based on dual-member constituencies with
one member of each gender. We then go on
to identify the specific changes needed in
the Constitution for dual-member
constituencies to become reality. Finally, we
have an alternative draft of the Women’s
Reservation Bill prescribing dual-member
constituencies.
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CRITERIA TO EVALUATE A
WOMEN'S RESERVATION BILL
I t would be useful to begin oursearch for effective criteria to
evaluate alternative women’s reservation
Bills with an explicit recognition of the role
of abstraction. A version that is worked out
entirely in the abstract may be very attractive
theoretically, but it runs the risk of being an
ivory tower approach to the issue. It could
emphasise apparently major changes that do
not have much of an effect on the ground. It
could also choose to ignore interconnections
– such as the ones with caste-based
reservations – that are an unavoidable part
of Indian reality. The effectiveness of such a
prescription would only be decided when it
is placed in the context of current reality. It
may then be better to begin from the other
end. We could remind ourselves of the aspects
of the current reality that have made
reservations for women in Parliament a dire
necessity. We can then explore the possible
link between such reservations and the larger
well-established approaches to reservations
in India. This will help us arrive at the
relevant theoretical criteria that would
determine the quality of reservations in India.
THE EXTENT OF RESERVATION
The evidence of discrimination against
women is so substantial and widespread that
it does not need to be elaborately recounted
here. Indicators ranging from protein intake
to sex ratios all show a deep-rooted gender
bias. The provisional results of the 2011
Census reveal a national sex-ratio in India
of 940 women per every thousand men. The
child sex-ratio, calculated for children in the
age group 0-6 years, for the year 2011 is
914 girls per 1000 boys.14 This is the lowest
recorded child sex-ratio in India after
2
14 Office of Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India
(2011) Census 2011: Provisional Population Totals. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/
archive/00517/India_Census_2011517160a.pdf (accessed on 08 December 2011).
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Independence. It is estimated that prenatal
sex selective abortion and infanticide have
resulted in half a million missing girls per
year.15 The very large number of crimes
against women has led women’s rights
activists like Ms Ranjana Kumari, President
of Women Power Connect to speak of
discrimination from ‘womb to tomb’.16
To make matters worse, any faith that
development and modernization would lead
to a decline in discrimination is proving to
be much too sanguine. Some of the worst
child-sex ratios are to be found in the
developed districts of Punjab and Haryana.
Modern technologies have played a crucial
role in the practice of female foeticide. And
the movement from a rural agrarian society
to an urban one also does not offer much
relief. On the contrary the work participation
rate of women, according to the 2001
Census, is substantially lower in urban areas,
at 11.6 per cent, than in the rural areas
where it is 31 per cent.17 There is also little
evidence that urbanization leads to a decline
in practices such as female foeticide and
infanticide, differential access to food and
medicine, child marriage and sexual or
psychological abuse, domestic violence, and
elder violence. The case for a gender
sensitive policy regime thus stares us in the
face.
In theory it could be argued that an
elected representative represents all who
have voted him or her to power. As the
electorate consists of both men and women,
the elected representatives can be expected
to represent the interests of both genders.
But the conditions that exist sixty-four years
after Independence suggest that this is far
from being true. The magnitude of gender
disparities points to elected representatives
themselves being perpetrators of gender bias.
It would seem to endorse the suggestion of
Philips that one cannot expect from any
other group the “degree of vigorous advocacy
that people bring to their own concerns”.18
It is now quite clear that women have very
specific needs and expectations from their
elected representatives; aspirations that are
not being addressed by male elected
representatives.
The fact that men do not take care of
women’s interests does not automatically
imply that women will do so. It can be argued
15 United Nations Economic and Social Council for Asia and Pacific. (2007) Violence Against Women:
Harmful traditional and cultural practices in the Asia and Pacific Region. Available at: http://
www.unescap.org/ESID/GAD/Publication/Others/Publication_EGM-VAW.pdf. (accessed on 08 December
2011)
16 Cited in United Nations Economic and Social Council for Asia and Pacific. (2007) Violence Against
Women: Harmful traditional and cultural practices in the Asia and Pacific Region. Available at: http://
www.unescap.org/ESID/GAD/Publication/Others/Publication_EGM-VAW.pdf. (accessed on 08 December
2011)
17 Office of Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.
(2001) Census 2001: Work Participation Rate. Available at http://censusindia.gov.in/Data_Products/
Library/Post_Enumeration_link/eci6_page3.html. (accessed on 08 December 2011)
18 Phillips, A. (1995) The Politics of Presence, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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that gender bias is part of an overarching
system of patriarchy which can dominate
the mindsets of both men and women. The
phenomenon of women representatives
allowing their husbands to play a role in
panchayats is well known. Stéphanie Tawa
Lama-Rewal in fact reports that the agenda
of the house did not change as a result of
women’s presence in Calcutta Municipal
Council.19 But this is not a universal finding.
There is also evidence of reservations for
women playing a positive role in the
functioning of elected bodies.
Chattopadhyay and Duflo report from their
village level research in two districts,
Birbhum in West Bengal and Udaipur, in
Rajasthan that “women invest more in goods
that are relevant to the needs of local women”
and also challenge the scepticism that women
or Scheduled Castes (SCs) are not capable
of being independent leaders.20 According
to their results, “Despite the handicaps they
may face in terms of education and prior
experience, and the preconception of weak
leadership, women have a real impact on
policy decisions”. Duflo argues that although
reservation “brings to power a group of
relatively inexperienced and less-educated
politicians, there is no evidence that this
comes at the expense of the quality of
decision making”.21 She recommends
reservation as a ‘powerful redistributive
tool’. Thus while it may be much too
sanguine to expect the mere act of
reservation for women in elected bodies to
completely destroy the patriarchal system,
there is enough evidence to suggest that the
greater presence of women in the Parliament
and State Assemblies is needed to even begin
the movement towards gender equality. It is
no doubt useful to emphasise the distinction
between presence and participation.22 We
cannot take the mere presence of women in
Parliament to mean that they would
participate effectively in that institution. But
it is obvious that if they are not even present
the question of participation, effective or
otherwise, does not arise.  Goetz and Hassim
consider to what extent increasing the
numbers of women in elected legislatures
will help to produce gender-sensitive policies
and better  accountability to women. They
further identify three conditions that will help
convert a ‘descriptive’ representation to a
more substantive one. They say that the
nature of the state, nature of the civil society
and the nature of the political system are
important factors that could ensure a more
CRITERIA TO EVALUATE A WOMEN'S RESERVATION BILL
19 Lama-Rewal, S. T. (2008) ‘Women in the Calcutta Municipal Corporation’ in M. Dhanda(ed) Reservations
for Women, pp. 197-244. New Delhi: Women Unlimited.
20 Chatopadhyay, R. and E. Duflo. (2003) ‘The Impact of Reservation in the Panchayati Raj: Evidence from
a Nationwide Randomised Experiment’, Economic and Political Weekly 39(9): 979-86.
21 Duflo, E. (2005) ‘Why Political Reservations?’, Journal of the European Economic Association 3(2-3):
668-78.
22 We are grateful to Nirmala Buch and Gopal Guru for emphasising this fact at the National Workshop on
‘Can Dual-Member Constituencies be the way forward for Women’s Reservation?’ National Institute of
Advanced Studies, Bangalore, December 14, 2011.
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substantive role for women in politics. They
offer the example of Uganda to illustrate
the limitations of quotas in specific contexts,
pointing out how new seats were created for
women, removing them from normal
competition for ward councillor seats,
making them ‘seem lesser politicians’.23
The fact that patriarchal functioning
is not the domain of men alone also
influences the nature of reservations. If we
believed that women alone could act on
women’s issues and these issues were
completely separate from the other issues
involved in the process of democratic
representation, the ideal response would
be to have separate constituencies for
women with women alone forming the
electorate for those constituencies. But
since the target is the larger system of
patriarchy which involves the beliefs of
both men and women, it is necessary for
women to bring gender equality based
worldviews into the larger process of
policy making. Women would have to
demonstrate that they are in elected bodies
not to merely look after the grievances of
their gender, but that they have an
alternative worldview that, with its gender
equality, would offer a more effective
system of governance. Playing this larger
role would require them to appeal to not
just other women but also to men. The
meaningful form of reservation for women
would then be in terms of seats rather than
separate electorates.























23 Goetz, A.M., Hassim, S. (eds.) (2003). No shortcuts to power: African women in politics and policy
making. Cape Town: Zed Books, p.246.
24 Cited in Rajya Sabha Secretariat (2008) ‘Reservation of Seats for Women in Legislative Bodies:
Perspectives’, Occasional Paper Series 1/2008.
The need to immediately push for an
increase in the presence of women in national
elected bodies is further strengthened by the
abysmal levels of representation of women
in the Lok Sabha. Women have been grossly
under-represented in Indian politics despite
numerous efforts. In the first Lok Sabha, the
women occupied only 4.4 per cent of the
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seats and even after sixty-four years of
democratic rule, only 10 per cent of the seats
in the Lok Sabha have been represented by
women members as is evident in Table 1. A
similar trend holds true for the status of
women’s representation in Rajya Sabha
which has also never crossed 12 per cent in
the last six decades. The scene is not different
when it comes to the representation of women
in the State Assemblies. The average
percentage of women members in the State
Assemblies was 6.94 in 2008.25
In order to see just how abysmal this
level of representation is we need to place
this performance in the global context.
As can be seen from Table 2, India’s
performance in finding place for women in
its Parliament is extremely poor. As is
perhaps to be expected, it is well below other
established democracies like Sweden,
Germany and United States of America.
What is more striking and worrisome is that
it is below other countries like Uganda,
which has poorer records in democratic
functioning as well as Pakistan, where
women apparently have lesser freedom. The
global pattern also further strengthens the
argument against expecting the presence of
women to improve as a consequence of
development. There is no clear pattern of
the presence of women in Parliaments across
the world being directly related to levels of
development. There are developed countries
that have done less well in getting their
women to Parliament than some poor
countries. This contrast is most striking when
we compare countries like United States of
America and Germany with Rwanda.
It is also important to note that the poor
presence of women in Parliament is not a
Table 2: Global Trends in Women in Parliament
1 Rwanda 2003 80 39 48.8
2 Sweden 2006 349 164 47.0
3 Cuba 2008 614 265 43.2
13 Nepal 2008 568 191 33.6
16 South Africa 2004 400 132 33.0
18 Germany 2005 613 194 31.6
19 Uganda 2006 332 102 30.7
44 Pakistan 2008 338 76 22.5
51 China 2008 2987 637 21.3
69 USA 2006 435 73 16.8
106 India 2004 541 49 9.1
Source: Website of Inter-Parliamentary Union (as on 31s t May, 2008)26
Rank Country Year Seats Women Percentage of women
25 Rajya Sabha Secretariat (2008) ‘Reservation of Seats for Women in Legislative Bodies: Perspectives’,
Occasional Paper Series 1/2008.
26 Cited in Rajya Sabha Secretariat (2008) ‘Reservation of Seats for Women in Legislative Bodies:
Perspectives’, Occasional Paper Series 1/2008.
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case of progressive political parties failing
to convince a reluctant electorate. The gender
bias within the political parties is reflected
in the number of women contestants they
have chosen. Table 3 makes it quite evident
that political parties are quite reluctant to
put up women candidates.
 What is even more interesting is that
this reluctance is despite the fact that women
candidates appear to do relatively better
than men when seen in terms of
the proportion of contestants who win. As
Table 4 tells us the percentage of seats won
by women in Parliament is consistently
Table 3: Gender-wise break-up of Contestants to
Lok Sabha in General Elections (Sixth to Fourteenth)
Sixth 2439 2369 70
Seventh 4629 4486 143
Eighth 5492 5330 162
Ninth 6160 5962 198
Tenth 4831 4517 314
Eleventh 13952 13353 599
Twelfth 4750 4476 274
Thirteenth 4648 4364 284
Fourteenth 5435 5081 355
Source: Website of Inter-Parliamentary Union (as on 31s t May, 2008) 27




Table 4: Comparison of percentage of contestants and percentage of
seats won by women (from Sixth Lok Sabha Elections)
Sixth 1.84 3.4 97.13 96.6
Seventh 3.04 5.1 96.91 94.9
Eighth 2.95 8.1 97.05 91.9
Ninth 3.21 5.29 96.79 94.71
Tenth 6.50 7.02 93.50 92.98
Eleventh 4.29 7.36 95.71 92.64
Twelfth 5.77 8.07 94.23 91.93
Thirteenth 6.11 9.02 93.89 90.98
Fourteenth 6.53 9.51 93.49 90.49
Source: Website of Inter-Parliamentary Union (as on 31s t May, 2008) 28








27 Cited in Rajya Sabha Secretariat (2008) ‘Reservation of Seats for Women in Legislative Bodies:
Perspectives’, Occasional Paper Series 1/2008.
28 Cited in Rajya Sabha Secretariat (2008) ‘Reservation of Seats for Women in Legislative Bodies:
Perspectives’, Occasional Paper Series 1/2008.
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higher than the percentage of women
contestants.
Thus more than six decades after
Independence gender disparities are not only
severe but this severity also shows few signs
of abating. This situation can be traced to
the very low presence of women in
Parliament. There is thus an urgent need to
correct the gender imbalance in Parliament.
The first criteria for judging a Women’s
Reservation Bill must then be the extent
of reservation it offers.
USING EXCLUSION TO FIGHT
EXCLUSION
One of the inevitable dimensions of the
use of reservation as a means of affirmative
action is that it uses exclusion as an
instrument to fight exclusion. It is based on
the understanding that a section of the
population is being excluded from positions
of entitlement or influence. There is then a
case for correcting this pattern by excluding
the dominant groups by reserving these
positions for those who have been previously
excluded. Thus since the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes have been excluded
from positions in government through the
normal functioning of society, there is a case
for reserving positions for this group. A
similar case was also made out in the
Mandal Commission for reservation for
Backward Castes. In the case of women too
we have seen there is a strong case for
reservations in Parliament and the State
Assemblies.
The use of exclusion to fight exclusion
can also be a double edged weapon. While
it excludes those who are currently dominant
to make place for the oppressed, it does not
necessarily fight the oppression itself. It has
been noticed that those who have been
oppressed in the past often become no less
oppressive when they come to power. The
formerly oppressed may not always
empathize with others who are oppressed.29
If we were to target oppression as a whole
and not just the oppressed it would be
necessary to also consider whether the levels
of exclusion in the systems after reservation
are lower as a whole and not just for those
who are currently excluded.
The overall levels of exclusion are
particularly important when the
reservations used to overcome the exclusion
of women has an impact on exclusion on
the basis of class and caste. There is the fear
that reservations for women will be used by
upper class women at the cost of the poorer
ones. Madhu Kishwar, Shetkari Mahila
Aghadi and Gail Omvedt believe that
reservation for women is only a symbol of
29 We are grateful to Dr Rajalakshmi Kamath for raising this issue at the National Workshop on ‘Can Dual-
Member Constituencies be the way forward for Women’s Reservation?’ National Institute of Advanced
Studies, Bangalore, December 14, 2011.
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tokenism and that reservation is pushed
by women who are in the ‘creamy layer’.30
The fears of an upper caste takeover are, if
anything even greater. Menon argues that
the concern among the upper castes caused
by the growing presence of backward castes
through successive elections is a major
reason for the upper castes to support
women’s reservation and the backward
castes to demand for a quota-within-quota
system within the Women’s Reservation
Bill.31
Understanding the Women’s
Reservation Bill based solely on the
attitudes to women is an incomplete analysis.
As Menon points out, “we tease out the
strands in the debate, we find two sets of
arguments for and against. There are
feminist (or at least, pro-women) arguments
for and against reservations for women,
and (implicitly or explicitly) caste-based
arguments for and against.” She elaborates
that in terms of the caste based arguments,
people who oppose Women’s Reservation
Bill based on caste do so as they express a
legitimate fear that only women from the
upper castes would be elected and this would
alter the composition of the Parliament in
favour of the upper castes and classes.32
Moreover studies on the impact of women’s
reservation in local bodies in Gujarat and
Karnataka have found that women’s
reservation has led to greater assertion of
power by dominant classes.33 It is alleged
that the upper castes support quotas for
women as it would limit the increasing
presence of the deprived classes in the
legislative bodies, while the lower castes/
classes oppose the present format for quota
allocation saying that it would lead to an
urban/elite takeover of the Parliament. Thus,
there is both an experienced and perceived
fear among certain groups that reservation
could alter the existing composition of
political representation.
There is, however, scope for another
response to the same challenge. This response
would focus on having more than one
representative for a constituency. In such a
case there would be a distinction between
seats and constituencies, with each
constituency having more than one seat. The
reservation of a seat then would exclude
others from contesting that seat, but there
would be another seat available in the
constituency for them to contest. This
30 Kishwar, M. (1996) ‘Women and Politics: Beyond Quotas’, Economic and Political Weekly 31 (43): 2867-
74.
Aghadi, S. M. (1997) ‘Reservation on Reservation’, Communalism Combat, June, pp. 6.
Omvedt, G. (2000) ‘Women and PR’, The Hindu. http://hindu.com/2000/09/12/stories/05122523.htm
(accessed on 08 December 2011)
31 Menon, N. (2000) ‘Elusive ‘Woman’: Feminism and Women’s Reservation Bill’, Economic and Political
Weekly 35 (43/44): 3836
32 Ibid
33 Hirway, H. (1989) ‘Panchayati Raj at the Crossroads’, Economic and Political Weekly 24 (29): 1663-7.
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approach would allow for an individual
to contest from any constituency, though
that individual would be excluded from
contesting specific seats. The degree of
exclusion in such a form of reservation
would then be less.
The impact of exclusion could also be
felt within a family. Women may get elected
to reserved seats that were once held by the
men in their household. This is usually
accepted by the men when the women make
it clear that they are only proxies for their
husbands or other male members of their
household. But when they begin to play the
role they were expected to play it is not
unknown for their husbands to turn against
them.34 A form of reservation that does not
completely exclude men would then ensure
that the elected women representatives are
not expected to pay a high price in terms of
relations within the family.
The second criterion we would need then is
the approach of a suggested Women’s
Reservation Bill to the challenge of
exclusion. A Bill that protects the rights of
women to be elected to Parliament and the
State Assemblies with as little exclusion as
possible on the basis of caste, class, or for
that matter even gender, would be preferable.
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
Implicit in the debate on exclusion
within exclusion was the understanding that
the Women’s Reservation Bill does not work
in isolation. Its efforts to fight exclusion of
women interact with initiatives to fight
exclusions on other bases. The effects of
Women’s Reservation Bill on the overall
quality of representation could in fact be
even greater. The specific processes the Bill
creates could itself impact the quality of
representation. For instance, if there is a
rotation of constituencies that are reserved
there will be times when a representative of
a constituency would not be able to contest
the next election, as the constituency would
then be reserved for a category to which the
individual does not belong. The individual
in such a situation, without the prospect of
re-election, would have little reason to
perform in a way that would appeal to his
or her constituents. This would directly
reduce the quality of representation of the
constituents.
It must also be remembered that the
relationship between reservations and the
quality of representation is a dynamic one.
A successful Women’s Reservation Bill
would provide women an opportunity to be
effective political representatives. Effective
representation would in turn improve their
ability to be elected without the benefit of
reservations. Ideally, reservations would be
able to create a situation where further
reservations are no longer necessary. The
task then is to decide when this has
happened, and to be able to stop reservations
34 We are grateful to Ms Nirmala Buch for providing wide-ranging evidence of this trend at the National
Workshop on ‘Can Dual-Member Constituencies be the way forward for Women’s Reservation?’ National
Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, December 14, 2011.
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at that time. The failure to carry out this
task would create new distortions in the
system of governance.
There is then a need to be sensitive to
the possibility of the process of reservation
having an impact on the quality of
representation. Defining the appropriate or
desirable quality of representation is of
course a matter of considerable debate. It is
an issue that is subject to a variety of
interpretations influenced by the diversity
of worldviews. But it should be possible to
come up with a working definition that
would enable us to decide whether a bill
adds or detracts from the quality of
representation. Hanna Pitkin provides,
perhaps, one of the most straightforward
definitions: to represent is simply to “make
present again”.35 On this definition, political
representation is the activity of making
citizens’ voices, opinions, and perspectives
“present” in the public policy making
processes. Political representation occurs
when political actors speak, advocate,
symbolize, and act on the behalf of others
in the political arena. The different options
for reservation for women must then also
be judged by the overall quality of
representation that can be expected after the
bill comes into force. Thus the third criterion
to compare different versions of the
Women’s Reservation Bill should then be
the likely impact a particular Bill will have
on the quality of representation.
In short, we can use three criteria to
evaluate different conceptions of the
Women’s Reservation Bill:
1. The extent of reservation a Bill
offers.
2. The degree of exclusion on the basis
of caste, class, or for that matter even
gender, that is built into the Bill.
3. The impact of the Bill on the quality
of representation.
35 Pitkin, H. F. (1967) The Concept of Representation, Los Angeles: University of California Press.
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THE CONSTITUTION
(ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH
AMENDMENT) BILL, 2008
T he debate on the issue of women’sreservation in India has been a
longstanding one and can be traced back to
as early as 1930 when Sarojini Naidu and
Begum Shah Nawaz wrote a letter to the
Prime Minister of Britain opposing the
inclusion of a clause on reserving seats for
women in Legislatures. The letter claimed
to be a representation of the women in India
and said that they would oppose any kind
of sex discrimination be it in favour or
against women.36 But post-independence,
persistence of discrimination against women
and inadequate representation of women in
the legislative bodies was highlighted in a
Government of India report in 1974. Several
women, including Lotika Sarkar and Vina
Majumdar responded to the report by saying
that “a political system cannot be based on
ideology alone but must keep in touch with
the actualities of the social situation and so
adjust its operations as to achieve the desired
goals of the society”.37 They reiterated the
fact that while applying the principle of
democracy to a society that is characterised
by inequality, special provisions like
reservation are tools to make the
environment ready for a desired change.
3
36 Naidu, S. , B.S. Nawaz, B.S and others (1931) ‘Women Challenges to Reservation in Pre-Independence
India’ in M. Dhanda (ed) Reservations for Women, pp. 3-11. New Delhi: Women Unlimited.
37 Sarkar, L. & V. Mazumdar,. (1974) ‘Dissenting Voices’ in M. Dhanda (ed) Reservations for Women,
pp. 11-17. New Delhi: Women Unlimited.
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In 1988, the first draft of the National
Perspective Plan (NPP) for women
suggested that the problem of under-
representation of women in politics could
be resolved by providing 30 per cent
reservation of seats in all elected bodies and
the allotment of reserved seats in the initial
years would be through nomination/co-
option.38 The nomination/co-option method
of filling up seats was faced with huge
protests. The final draft of NPP had two
major changes. First, it suggested reservation
of seats for women at the Panchayat
and municipalities level and, second, it
recommended that the seats shall be filled
up through direct election. These changes
were then reflected in the 64th Constitutional
Amendment Bill (1989) which was later
enacted as the 73rd and 74th Constitutional
Amendment Acts in 1993.39
After, a fairly impressive success of the
reservation of seats for women in the local
bodies, the demand to have seats reserved
for women in the Parliament and State
Legislative Assemblies gained momentum.
After a long battle, the Women’s Reservation
Bill was first tabled in Parliament in 1996
and later on in 1998 and 1999 without being
passed. The most recent attempt in these lines
was the introduction of Women’s Reservation
Bill, which was introduced in 2008 in the
Rajya Sabha and later passed with a
majority support in 2010. However due to
a deadlock on the issue in the Lok Sabha,
the Bill has not yet been enacted. These
repeated failures were however not without
a silver lining. The experience revealed a
change in the perception of political leaders.
From questioning the need for women’s
reservation the focus shifted to questioning
only the nature and form of women’s
reservation while accepting a need for it.
This shift in focus allows us to take a closer
look at the Women’s Reservation Bill
(2008)40; evaluating it in terms of the criteria
we had listed in the previous chapter.
WOMEN’S RESERVATION
BILL (2008)
The One Hundred and Eighth
Amendment Bill (2008) aimed at addressing
issues of gender inequality and gender
discrimination through the means of women’s
political empowerment. This was to be done
by reserving a third of the seats for women,
with the reserved seats being rotated in a way
that all seats would be reserved for one term
in every block of three terms.
38 Government of India, (1988). National perspective plan for women, 1988-2000 A.D, Report of the core
group set up by the Department of Women & Child Development, Ministry of Human Resource
Development.
39 Rajya Sabha Secretariat (2008) ‘Reservation of Seats for Women in Legislative Bodies: Perspectives’,
Occasional Paper Series 1/2008.
40 The Constitution (One Hundred and Eighth Amendment) Bill, 2008. Available at: http://
www.silverinnings.com/docs/Elder%20Law/Other%20laws/Women%20Reservation%20Bill%
20-%20India%202008.pdf
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The key characteristics of the Bill41
include:
♦ Reservation for women, as nearly as
may be, one-third seats of the present
strength of the Lok Sabha and State
Legislative Assemblies.
♦ As nearly as may be one-third of the
seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and
Schedule Tribes shall be reserved for
women.
♦ Seats to be reserved for women
shall be determined through a process
of rotation by draw of lots in such a
way that a seat shall be reserved
only once in three consecutive
elections.
♦ Reservation for women in respect of
nominations of members of Anglo-
Indian Community in Lok Sabha and
State Legislative Assemblies.
♦ As nearly as may be one-third of the
seats shall be reserved for women in
the Legislative Assembly of National
Capital Territory of Delhi.
♦ Reservation of seats for women shall
cease after 15 years of the enactment
of the Bill.
This Bill is undoubtedly radical in
terms of its likely effects on the
representation of women in Parliament, but
when these effects are evaluated in terms of
the three broad criteria we had identified,
the picture is more mixed.
EXTENT OF RESERVATION
The idea of reserving a third of the
seats for women has emerged as some kind
of a magic number for the entire debate on
women’s reservation.Madhu Kishwar argues
that
“There are several problems
inherent in this particular scheme. To
begin with, why a 33% quota? What
is the significance of this number??
Why not 13 or 43 per cent or even
73 per cent? The reservation quota
for all other groups such as the
Scheduled castes and tribes has been
determined on the basis of their
numerical strength in the overall
population. Not so for women. In
India the proportion of women as
compared to men is a little less than
50 per cent. So why not 49 per cent
reservation for women? Does the
magical figure of 33 per cent
represent some near-future scenario
of our declining sex ratio? Are our
policy makers anticipating the advent
of all kinds of new technologies to
bring down the already low sex-ratio
to the one-third of the population?
This is not at all to suggest that 33
per cent is a small figure, especially
when offered in a silver platter, as is
happening in our case.”
She quotes examples of women’s
political under-representation in countries
like UK, US, France and Canada (where
41 Ibid
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women occupy only less than 10 per cent of
the seats in the Parliament), to appreciate
that reserving one-third of the seats in
legislatures would mean that India will have
180 women in the Lok Sabha which
according to her is a quantum leap.42  There
is widespread acceptance of this number
apparently because this is seen as critical
mass43 that is needed for the voice of the
elected women to be heard. It could be
argued, on a more coldly logical basis, that
seats should be equally divided between the
genders, so that a 50 per cent target would
appear reasonable. We could argue that since
women currently win 10 per cent of the
general seats the effective representation for
women in Parliament after the reservation
be 43 per cent. But it could be just as easily
argued that in elections when the ten per
cent of seats normally won by women are
reserved, the additional effect of reservations
will only be 23 per cent. More than any
simple rational argument then the figure of
one third can be attributed to the rhetoric of
the debate on reservations. It began as some
sort of a minimum number of seats for
reservations. But the Joint Committee of
Parliament that reviewed the Bill that was
introduced in 1996 recommended that the
words ‘not less than one-third’ should be
replaced by ‘as nearly as may be, one-third’.
Be that as it may, there is no getting away
from the fact that one-third of the seats is a
significant number. This is particularly so when
we consider the role women parliamentarians
have played in the past. Kumari and Dubey
in their study on women MPs in the tenth Lok
Sabha found that a majority of the issues raised
by women MPs were related to women issues
and that there was a unity among these MPs
and took a common stand on women related
issues and on the indifference of male MPs to
women issues.44 Reservation of a third of the
seats in Parliament for women would then
make a significant difference to the character
of Parliament.
THE CHALLENGE OF EXCLUSION
The exclusion in the current Women’s
Reservation Bill  takes two distinct forms.
The first form is in terms of the reservation
for women having the effect of excluding
the Backward Castes. There is evidence from
the working of women’s reservation at the
Panchayat level that the seats reserved for
women are prone to ‘elite capture’. D’Lima,
for instance, notes that the experience of
women’s reservation at the local bodies’
level in Maharashtra has resulted in the
strengthening of upper caste dominance in
42 Buch, N. (2000) ‘Women’s Experience in New Panchayats: The Emerging Leadership of Rural Women’,
CWDS, Occassional Paper No. 35
43 Kumari, R. & A. Dubey. (1994) Women Parliamentarians: a Study in the Indian Context, New Delhi:
Har-Anand Publications.
44 D’Lima, H. (1983) Women in Local Government: A Study of Maharastra, New Delhi: Concept Publications.
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these bodies.45 The phenomenon of the women
who win reserved seats being typically from
the dominant castes has been noted in other
states as well. In such cases the reservation
for women becomes, in effect, a reservation
for the dominant castes. This could lead to
the legislative bodies at both the centre and
the states becoming skewed in favour of the
dominant castes. This has led to a strong
demand for a quota for the Backward Castes
within the quota for women. This demand for
a quota within quota has become the major
stumbling block for the passage of the
Women’s Reservation Bill.
The second form of exclusion is the more
obvious one of men being excluded from the
reserved seats. When seen in a purely gender
perspective this fact can be dismissed as a
mere corrective to the deeply entrenched
phenomenon of the exclusion of women. But
when we move from the theoretical realm to
the practice of politics, another dimension
arises that cannot be easily brushed aside:
the possibility that the reserved constituencies
will be chosen in a way that targets individual
male politicians. An established male
politician who has nurtured his constituency
could find the ground beneath his feet slipping
away if his constituency is suddenly reserved
for women. In order to address this very real
difficulty the Women’s Reservation Bill
(2008), as indeed some of the earlier versions,
prescribes a rotation of reserved seats. Taking
a block of three general elections together, it
requires that a different third of the seats be
reserved for women in each general election.
Consequently each seat will be reserved for
women once in every three general elections.
This approach spreads the exclusion of male
politicians evenly across all constituencies.
But this is not without its consequences
for the quality of representation in our
democracy.
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
Effective representation of their
constituents is the cornerstone on which a
politician builds his or her career. This
representation can take two forms. First, it
involves advocating policies and legislation
that help the constituents, and second, it
requires a more direct nursing of a constituency
in terms of dealing with the immediate
concerns of the constituents. The balance
between these two requirements would ideally
vary according to the level of the elected body,
with the local bodies taking care of the
immediate service and other local
requirements, leaving the state and national
level bodies to focus on legislation. These roles
of elected representatives in different bodies
has however been altered by two developments
in the functioning of Indian Parliament and
Legislative bodies. The anti-defection law has
meant that the elected members of Parliament
and the legislative bodies have to vote along
with their party whip, even if they personally
believe that a particular piece of legislation
45 Nanivadekar, M. (2003) ‘Dual-Member Constituencies: Resolving Deadlock on Women’s Reservation’,
Economic and Political Weekly 38 (43): 4506-10.
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goes against the interests of their constituents.
This effectively takes the legislative aspect of
their functioning out of the picture, leaving
them only with the task of nursing their
constituencies through local area development.
In this task they are aided by the MPs Local
Area Development Fund and its equivalents
at the level of the state assembly. The success
or failure of an elected representative is then
seen in terms of what is done for his or her
constituency. And those that do well get the
prize of re-election.
The policy of rotation has a direct impact
on this prize. In each round of general
elections there will be one-third of the
constituencies that will be reserved in the next
round of general elections. The male members
representing these constituencies then lose the
possible prize of re-election. No matter how
well they perform they will not be able to get
re-elected as they will not be allowed to stand
for elections in the next round. They will then
have no incentive to focus on the all-round
development of their constituencies. It is then
quite possible that the funds for local area
development will be used in a way that
supports their personal interests rather than
that of the constituency as a whole. Again,
evidence from reservation at the Panchayat
level suggests that women who win from a
reserved constituency typically do not win the
same seat when it is made a general
constituency. They too can then choose to
behave in a manner not different from that of
the male representatives whose constituencies
will be reserved in the next round. Thus around
two-thirds of the elected representatives would
not have any chance of being re-elected. The
sitting representatives MLAs will have to forgo
the political base and the investments in terms
of time, energy and efforts that they make on
their constituencies. And since the specific seats
that constitute this two-thirds will keep
changing, the entire system would be one
devoid of a long-term perspective. As
Nanivadekar points out, this would imply that
no one in politics can see it as a full time
career option and leading to a ‘political culture’
that is based on short-term gains and
unaccountability.46
The uncertainty about individual
political careers is given another dimension
by the effective uncertainty about the
Women's Reservation Bill itself. It is not quite
certain how long the provisions of the Bill
will hold. The Women Reservation Bill (2008)
envisions the closure of the reservation of seats
for women in Lok Sabha and the State
Legislative Assemblies in fifteen years. That
is to say, the Bill is only supposed to be for
one cycle of three full parliamentary terms.
But the experience with other reservations
suggests that once they are introduced,
removing them can be very difficult. We could
then see the recycling of the entire debate
once again after fifteen years. And since every
constituency is affected by this process, this
is an uncertainty we could do without.
46 Nanivadekar, M. (2003) 'Dual-Member Constituencies: Resolving Deadlock on Women's Reservation',
Economic and Political Weekly 38 (43): 4506-10.
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DUAL-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES
A large part of the debate onreservation of seats for women
has, understandably, revolved around the
official formats, whether it was the
reservation mandated by the 73rd and 74th
Constitutional Amendments or the Women’s
Reservation Bills tabled in the Parliament
in 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2008. The focus on
the official versions must not however give
the impression that there was a dearth of
alternatives available. An Alternative
Women’s Reservation Bill was proposed by
the Forum for Democratic Reforms in the
year 2000.47 According to that proposal, a
law should be enacted to amend the
Representation of People Act 1950, making
it mandatory for every recognized political
party to nominate women candidates for
election in one-third of constituencies. It also
mandated the political parties to nominate
women candidates in one-third of the
constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes. This was based on the
rationale that the root cause for the lack of
political empowerment of women is the
patriarchic structure of the political parties
which do not give tickets to women to contest
in elections. The proposal suggested that
each political party could decide which
constituencies it would like to field women
from. In order to avoid clustering women
candidates in states where the chances of
political parties winning the elections were
weak, the proposal also laid down that the
unit for consideration for a Lok Sabha would
be a State or Union Territory and for the
State Legislative Assembly, the unit for
consideration should be three contiguous Lok
Sabha constituencies. The most controversial
section of this proposed Bill was its penalty
4
47 Narayan, J., D. Sheth, Y. Yadav and M. Kishwar (2000) ‘Enhancing Women’s Representation in the
Legislatures: An Alternative to the Government Bill for Women’s Reservation’, Manushi 116: 5-9.
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clause which suggested that in the case of
failure of the political parties to nominate
one-third women candidates, two male
candidates from the party would lose their
party symbol, affiliation and related
advantages, for a shortfall of every one
woman candidate. This stringent penalty
clause overlooked the prevalent system of
party oligarchy. In most of the parties,
nomination of candidates was decided by
the ‘Party High Command’ and the
individual members had a very limited or
no role to play in this process. In such
situations, penalizing male members who
have no real role in nomination process was
unfair.48 The proposal also could not escape
the charge of tokenism. It did try to address
this issue by insisting that the reserved seat
should be within a predefined region. But
given the fact that the influence of most
political parties is not evenly spread even
within a state or parts of a state, the
possibility of giving the weakest seat to the
woman candidate was very real. Owing to
its rather extreme penalties combined with
the possibility of leaving the seats that were
least likely to be won for women, the Bill
did not get sufficient support. Though the
Bill got the status of a Private Member Bill
and received support from some high profile
political leaders and the then Chief Election
Commissioner, the proposal was on the whole
not well received.
Another alternative that has been on
the board in different forms for a long time
is that of multi-member constituencies. This
approach makes a distinction between
constituencies and seats with each
constituency having more than one seat.
Following the fall-out over the 73rd and 74th
Constitutional Amendment Acts in 1993 that
mandates 33 per cent reservation of seats
for women at the local body level, Shetkari
Sangathana in Maharashtra proposed
having multiple members representing a
constituency.49 The proposal involved
clubbing together of three constituencies to
form one constituency and the newly formed
constituency to be represented by three
members, of whom one shall be a woman.
According to this proposal the first two seats
could go to two candidates who poll the
highest number of votes, whether male or
female. The third seat would be reserved for
women and the candidate who got the highest
votes among the women candidates, but was
not among the top two candidates overall,
would be elected as the women’s
representative. This proposal seemed
acceptable to many groups as it ensured that
every constituency would have a woman
representative. Since the other two seats were
open for a fair competition, the multi-member
constituency proposal did not take away the
right to contest from men in any constituency
ensuring a more inclusive way of empowering
48 Rajan, I. and J. Retnakumar (2005) ‘Women’s reservation Bill: Some Emerging Issues’, Economic and
Political Weekly 40 (39): 4190-92.
49 Kishwar, M. (1996) ‘Women and Politics: Beyond Quotas’, Economic and Political Weekly 31 (43):
2867-74.
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women. This measure also addressed issues
related to the rights of voters as it did not
restrict the right of the voter to choose the best
candidate available irrespective of gender,
even as it ensured election of women
representatives. However, the proposal created
very large constituencies. And this would be a
serious constraint in the current Indian context.
Figure 1 tells us that Indian constituencies are
already among the largest in the world in terms
of the number of constituents, far more than
that of other functioning democracies.
Clubbing three such already huge
constituencies to form a new constituency
would create an unmanageable entity that
neither the Election Commission nor the
political parties would be able to manage.
It is in this context that the proposal
for dual-member constituencies gains
significance. The proposal has been proposed
in different forms. In 2003 Medha
Nanivadekar proposed an alternative that
involved the conversion of 181 constituencies
in the Lok Sabha – a third of the total
constituencies, into dual-member
constituencies.50 If the Parliament was
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divided into three sets of 181 constituencies,
one set would be converted into dual-member
constituencies while the other two sets would
remain single-member constituencies. This
would take the total strength of the Lok
Sabha to 724 members. The decision on
which 181 constituencies would be converted
into dual-member constituencies, according
to the proposal, would be based on system
of draw of lots. Within the selected dual-
member constituencies, she proposed that the
constituencies with sitting women members
be converted to dual-women-member
constituencies. The main problem with the
proposal in this form was that it made a
significant difference in the pattern of
representation between the constituencies
that were chosen to be double member
constituencies and the rest. A constituency
that had two Members of Parliament would
have greater representation in Parliament
than a constituency that had only one
Member of Parliament. This would create
an unacceptable imbalance in the
functioning of Parliament.
This difficulty was apparently
recognized when in 2009, as a part of
campaign to realize women’s political
empowerment, Medha Nanivadekar and
other women’s organizations demanded the
conversion of all the constituencies into
dual-member constituencies. There was
now no distinction between one set of 181
constituencies and the rest. Under this
proposal all the constituencies of the Lok
Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies
would have two representatives – one male
member and one female member. This would
double the members of the Lok Sabha to
1088, even as the number of constituencies
remained the same at 544. Each voter would
be entitled to two ballots one consisting of
only male candidates and the other of only
female candidates. The first-past-the-post
system would then operate in both the
ballots.
The main argument against this
proposal has been one of costs. But when we
consider the fact that the number of people
represented by each Member of Parliament
in India is among the highest in the world,
there is a significant case for increasing the
number of Members of Parliament. The
additional cost could be easily justified as a
legitimate cost of a functioning democracy.
The magnitude of the increase in costs could
also be kept in check through other measures
such as the two members sharing the Local
Area Development fund for the constituency.
Another advocate of dual-member
constituencies is Meena Dhanda who argues
for the conversion of all the territorial
constituencies into dual member ones as she
believes that, considering the representative
to people ratio, India is grossly under-
represented.51
51 Dhanda, M. (2008) ‘Making Room by Adding Seats’, Seminar 586 http://www.india-seminar.com/2008/
586/586_meena_dhanda.htm (accessed on 09 December 2011)
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With the instinctive argument about
costs out of the way we could subject the
dual-member constituency proposal to the
same three criteria we used to evaluate the
Women’s Reservation Bill that was passed
in the Rajya Sabha in 2010.
EXTENT OF RESERVATION
By reserving 50 per cent of the seats
in Parliament and Legislative Assemblies
for women, this proposal clearly goes a step
beyond the current commonly accepted
number of one-third of the seats. It explicitly
recognizes that women must get a share of
the seats in Parliament that is consistent with
their share of the population. Equally
important, it also addresses the problem of
women only winning from a limited set of
constituencies. This proposal ensures that
every constituency in the country, both for
Parliament and the State Assemblies, would
have a woman representative. Thus both in
terms of number as well as the geographical
spread of representation the proposal for
dual-member constituencies with one male
and one female representative is in line with
the presence of women in the population.
CHALLENGE OF EXCLUSION
As we have stated earlier all forms of
reservation bring with them some form of
exclusion. By reserving a seat for those who
are oppressed we are excluding those who
are not. Such exclusion is perfectly justified.
But it also does limit the choice of voters.
Ideally then we would need a system of
reservations that provides the desired levels
of representation for those who are
oppressed while simultaneously keeping the
levels of exclusion to the lowest levels
possible. The proposal for dual-member
constituencies goes a long way towards
meeting this requirement. It increases the
level of reservation for women in Parliament
to 50 per cent, five times the highest achieved
so far. At the same time it does so in a way
that does not prevent men from contesting
in any constituency in the country.
The reservation for women without
excluding men must also be seen in the
context of the dominance of the family in
Indian politics. As the woman does not take
the place of the man there is scope for greater
acceptance within the family. At the same
time this does raise the possibility of both
the male and the female members in a
constituency belonging to the same family,
typically the husband and the wife. This
would increase the dominance of the family
in the constituency. The possibility of the
dominance of a single family is undoubtedly
a serious concern in the Indian context. But
the relevant question here is whether the
dual-member constituency increases the
dominance of the family compared to a
system of reserving a third of the seats for
women. On the face of it this may seem to
be the case as it increases the number of
seats the family can hold in the elected body.
In terms of the percentage of seats in
Parliament, though, there would be no
change even if both seats are won by the
same family. Instead of one member of the
family representing the entire constituency
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in the case of single-member constituencies,
the constituency can be represented by two
members of the same family. On the contrary
the fact that there are two seats available to
the electorate could make it difficult for a
family to win both, as the electorate may
decide to share its loyalties between
contending families. In such cases the dual-
member constituency will offer an
opportunity to be represented by more than
one family, while the single-member
constituency by definition will have only one
family representing it.
Dual-member constituencies can also
offer greater flexibility in the functioning of
existing reservations. Members of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are
today typically elected from constituencies
reserved for them. Though they can also
stand from general constituencies, their
ability to win from the general constituencies
is even today very limited. Members of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who
belong to the constituency that is reserved
for them would then have an advantage in
terms of being able to stand from their home
constituencies. This is an advantage that
members of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes belonging to other
constituencies do not share. This disparity
between the SC/ST members of reserved
constituencies and the SC/ST voters of other
constituencies could be reduced if the
reserved seats were spread over a larger
number of constituencies. Dual-member
constituencies allow this to be done. As the
number of seats doubles so would the number
of seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes. If both the seats in a
constituency that is currently reserved for
the SC/ST are reserved for these groups, the
spread of reservation would be the same.
But the SC/ST seats could also be spread
over a larger number of constituencies. For
instance, in the 84 existing constituencies
reserved for Scheduled Castes, one of the
seats could continue being reserved for
Scheduled Castes men, the other being for
general category women. The additional 84
seats that would be reserved for the
Scheduled Castes due to the doubling of seats
kept for Scheduled Castes women in other
constituencies. The reservation for Scheduled
Castes as a whole, both men and women,
could then be spread over 168 constituencies,
around 30 per cent of the total constituencies.
This would spread the opportunity for a
member of the Scheduled Castes to be elected
over a much wider region. The same would
apply to Scheduled Tribes as well.
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
There are several reasons to believe
that a dual-member constituency would
improve the quality of representation. It
would allow voters in each constituency to
compare the performance of their two
representatives. It would give them the
option of approaching the other
representative in the case of one
representative being inaccessible. They
would also be able to compare the spending
of the Local Area Development fund by the
two representatives.
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This pressure would of course exist only
if the representative was able to seek re-
election. Dual-member constituencies allow
for this to happen, as there is no need for
rotation of reserved constituencies.
Individual politicians would be able to build
political careers on the basis of their
performance when they are elected. Women
politicians too would have the benefit of
nurturing the same constituency instead of
having to move to another constituency to
tap the benefit of reservations.
This sense of permanence also extends
to the process of reservations itself. In any
reservations for the oppressed based on the
complete exclusion of others, there will
always be the question of when do those who
benefit from reservation cease to be
oppressed. The usual response to this
question is to place a timeframe for
reservations. The Women’s Reservation Bill
(2008) expects reservation for women to last
just 15 years after which women would
presumably have overcome the gender
divide. This does appear to be a rather
optimistic assumption, leading to the
possibility of further debate when this period
comes to an end. In the case of dual-member
constituencies on the other hand this
problem does not arise. Since both men and
women are given representation in line with
their share of the population, there is no need
for any closure clause. The system of dual-
member constituencies with one male and
one female member could be a permanent
one.
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AMENDMENTS TO THE LAWS TO
PROVIDE FOR DUAL-MEMBER
CONSTITUENCIES
I. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,
1950
A. COMPOSITION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES
The Constitution of India provides for
constitution of the Union Parliament and the
State Legislatures, particularly in Articles
80, 81 and 170 respectively. These provisions
providing for the maximum number of
representatives to the various legislative
bodies envisage constituencies that will be
represented by a single member. Several
provisions need to be amended to enable
dual-member constituencies.
Union Territories are largely under the
supervision of the Central Government. Delhi
and Pondicherry are the only Union
Territories that have legislative bodies;
Article 239AA that deals with Legislative
Assembly for Delhi needs to be amended.
Fourth Schedule of the Constitution that
lists out the number of representatives from
each State to the Council of States is also to
be amended.
B. RESERVATIONS
Part XVI of the Constitution deals with
special provisions for certain groups:
Scheduled castes, Scheduled tribes, Anglo-
Indians etc. Articles 330 to 333 pertaining
to reservations to the legislative bodies need
to be amended to facilitate dual-member
constituencies.
C. PROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT
According to Article 368 of the
Constitution, provisions may be generally
amended with a “Bill introduced in either
House of Parliament and when the Bill is
passed in each House by a majority of the
total membership of that House and by a
majority of not less than two-thirds of the
members of that House present and voting”.
Upon its passing, the Bill should receive the
5
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assent of the President for the amendment
to be effectual.
However, in case of amendments
pertaining to representation of the States in
Parliament, the amendment shall also
“require to be ratified by the Legislatures
of not less than one-half of the states by
resolution to that effect passed by those
Legislatures before the Bill making
provision for such amendment is presented
to the President for assent”. Thus,
amendments to Articles 80, 81 and the Fourth
Schedule pertaining to composition of the
Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha would
require ratification of the State Legislatures
as well.
II. STATUTES
In addition to the Constitution of India,
statutes such as the Representation of Peoples
Act provide for composition and reservations
to legislative bodies which need to be
amended to reflect the constitutional
changes and implement dual-member
constituencies. The changes that are required
are listed below:
Table 5: List of Statutes and the specific Provisions to be amended
No. Statute Provisions to be amended
1. Representation of the People
Act 1950
Section 4(3), 7(2), 7A(2) (total number), insert a non-
obstante overriding provision providing for dual-
member constituencies, First Schedule, Second
Schedule and Third Schedule (number of seats).
2. Representation of the People
Act 1951
Insert a non-obstante overriding provision providing
for dual-member constituencies.
First Schedule on the allocation of seats in the Lok
Sabha, Second Schedule on the total number of seats
in the Legislative Assemblies, Third Schedule on the
allocation of seats in the Legislative Councils.
3. Government of National Capital
Territory of Delhi Act 1991
Section 3 (composition), Section 38 (delimitation)
4. Government of Union
Territories Act 1963
Section 3 (composition), Section 39 (delimitation),
Section 40 (representation of Pondicherry in the Lok
Sabha), Section 43A (delimitation in Mizoram), Section
43C (delimitation in Arunachal Pradesh)
Source: Authors’ Compilation
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DRAFT BILL TO IMPLEMENT
DUAL-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES
Bill No.__________
THE CONSTITUTION (ONE HUNDRED
AND ______ AMENDMENT) BILL, 2011
A
BILL
Further to amend the Constitution of
India to provide for dual-member
constituencies.
BE it enacted by the Parliament in the
Sixty-second year of the republic of India
as follows:-
1. (1) This Act may be called the
Constitution( ___Amendment) Act,
2012.
(2) It shall come into force on such
date, as the central government may,
by the notification in the Official
Gazette, appoint.
2. In article 80 of the Constitution, in
clause (1), in sub-clause (a), for the
words “twelve members”, the words
6
“twelve male members and twelve
female members” shall be substituted.
3. In article 80 of the Constitution, in
clause (1), in sub-clause (b), for the
words “two hundred and thirty eight
representatives”, the words “two
hundred and thirty eight male
representatives and two hundred and
thirty eight female representatives”
shall be substituted.
4. In  article 81 of the Constitution, in
clause (1), in sub-clause (a), for the
words “five hundred and thirty
members”, the words “ five hundred and
thirty male members and five hundred
and thirty female members”.
5. In article 81 of the Constitution, in
clause (1), in sub-clause (a) the
following provision shall be inserted
at the end namely:-
“Provided that each territorial
constituency shall be allotted two seats
in such a manner that one seat is
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allotted to a male member and the other
seat is allotted to a female member”.
6. In article 81 of the constitution, in
clause (1), in sub-clause (b), for the
words “twenty members”, the words
“twenty male members and twenty
female members” shall be substituted.
7. In article 170 of the Constitution, in
clause (1), for the words “five hundred
members”, the words “five hundred
male members and five hundred
female members” shall be substituted.
8. In article 170 of the Constitution, in
clause (1), the following provision shall
be inserted at the end namely:-
“Provided that each territorial
constituency shall be allotted two seats
in such a manner that one seat is
allotted to a male member and the other
seat is allotted to a female member”.
9. In article 239AA of the Constitution,
in clause (2),in sub-clause (a), the
following provision shall be inserted
at the end namely:-
“Provided that each territorial
constituency shall be allotted two seats
in such a manner that one seat is
allotted to a male member and the other
seat is allotted to a female member”.
10. In article 331 of the Constitution, for
the words “two members”, the words
“two male members and two female
members” shall be substituted.
11. In article 333 of the Constitution, for
the words “one member”, the words “one
male member and one female member”
shall be substituted.
In the Fourth Schedule of the
Constitution the allocation of the seats in the
Council of States shall be reallocated to:
Source: Authors’ Compilation


